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COMPLICITY WITH THE ARAB BLACKLIST:
BUSINESS EXPEDIENCE VERSUS ABRIDGMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
In February, 1975, the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai
B'rith charged two federal agencies' and seven private companies2
with "violating Government civil rights laws3 by discriminating
against Jews, either under orders from Arab countries or volun-
tarily in the hope of obtaining business in Arab countries."4 Sub-
sequently, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Gerald Parsky said
that United States companies which cooperated with the Arab
blacklist against Israel "might be subject to legal action if their
compliance was based on religious or ethnic discrimination."' He
went on to state that "[t]he Saudis said the boycott is not based
on either race or religion . . .[but] on whether a firm is doing
business with Israel."6 In December, 1975, the American Jewish
Congress [hereinafter referred to as AJC] filed suit against Sec-
retary of State Kissinger,7 charging that Jews had been excluded
from programs supported by the United States in Saudi Arabia.'
1. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation and The Army Corps of Engineers.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
2. Ashland Chemical Company, Bendix-Siyanco Company, Chase Manhattan Bank,
Dresser Corporation, Guaranteed Mortgage Services, International Schools Service of
Princeton, New Jersey, and Wizard Mortgage Banking Corporation. Id.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974).
4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 4. These alleged acts of discrimination were
denied by all of the named parties except Bendix-Siyanco and Dresser, which could not
be reached for comment. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1975, at 6, col. 1. The Army Corps of
Engineers acknowledged before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multina-
tional Corporations that, in deference to the policy of Saudi Arabia, the Corps did not
assign Jews to work there. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith has initiated a number of administrative
proceedings, in state and federal agencies, as part of their effort to prevent alleged discrim-
inatory practices by United States businesses. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith,
Press Release, Jan. 30, 1976.
5. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
6. Id.
7. American Jewish Congress v. Kissinger, Civil No. 75-2099 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 17,
1975).
8. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1975, at 5, col. 3. Also named as defendants in the suit were
Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Gerald
L. Parsky, Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of the Interior Thomas
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Most recently, in January, 1976, the United States itself filed an
antitrust action against the Bechtel Corporation.9 Bechtel was
charged with conspiring to exclude companies blacklisted by the
Arab nations from its construction projects.'"
The Arab blacklist is aimed at companies which conduct
business with Israel or which employ Jews." The increased politi-
cal and economic power of Arab countries, a result of petrodollar
revenues and large sums of investment capital, have greatly en-
hanced their influence over corporations doing business with
them. Such leverage can have a profound effect upon United
States foreign and domestic policies' 2 and upon the constitutional
rights of United States citizens.' 3
This note will analyze instances in which a foreign nation's
restrictive domestic policies have allegedly resulted in depriva-
tion of the civil rights of United States citizens, as well as the
remedies available to those discriminated against and the bar-
riers to such remedies. Additionally, the role of the courts will be
examined with regard to the choice between enforcing civil rights
legislation and allowing the executive branch to formulate foreign
policy.
S. Kleppe, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Daniel
Parker.
9. United States v. Bechtel Corp., Civil No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
10. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1976, § 4, at 2, col. 3. This suit, although the only federally
initiated action to date, is some indication that the federal government may prefer to
challenge alleged discriminatory practices as antitrust violations rather than as civil rights
issues. This approach might mitigate embarassment to the executive branch in its rela-
tionships with Arab nations. Id.
11. See Brief for Petitioner-Respondent at 8, American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 9
N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961). The brief discusses a 1952 proceeding
before the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Shade v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Company, Civil No. 3717-52 (1952), in which it was disclosed that Saudi Arabia
refused to deal with companies which hired Jews, even if they were employed in the United
States. Additionally, in 1953, the State Commission Against Discrimination ascertained
that Saudi Arabia was systematically refusing to do business with any company which
"in any way is influenced by Jewish management." Brief for Petitioner-Respondent, supra
at 8. The Anti-Defamation League has published a list of domestic and foreign concerns
which it believes have been boycotted by the Arab governments for doing business with
Israel. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1975, at 6, col. 1.
12. This note will confine itself to the domestic ramifications.
13. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment prohibits unjustifiable discrimination based upon race); United Workers v. Mitch-
ell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (Court assumed, in dicta, that a classification based upon the
fact that a person was Jewish would be unconstitutional).
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I. ACTION IN STATE COURTS
United States state courts are viable forums for the litigation
of cases where discriminatory practices of a foreign sovereign are
at issue. This is particularly true in the context of employment
and the use of services,'4 areas which are generally protected from
discrimination by state law.'5 In states where statutes of this type
exist, actions are normally initiated by complaint before an ad-
ministrative agency."
New York permits initial recourse to the courts by an action
for damages or other relief, 7 as well as actions subsequent to an
administrative determination.' Although New York's Human
Rights Law'9 is not unique, New York is the only state in which
these issues have actually been litigated.
A. The Aramco Litigation
In 1959, the issue of the Arabian American Oil Company's
[hereinafter referred to as Aramco] discriminatory policies
against the hiring of Jews was presented before a New York state
14. American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct.
1959), modified, 10 App. Div. 2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d
223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961); South African Airways v. N.Y. State Div.
of Human Rights, 64 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1970). See American
Airlines, Inc. v. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 29 App. Div. 2d 178, 286 N.Y.S.2d 493
(1st Dep't 1968), noted in 29 A.L.R.3d 1402 (1968). See also New York Times Co. v. City
of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79 Misc. 2d 1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 49 App. Div. 851, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1st Dep't 1975).
15. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 1420 (West 1975); CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. §§
31-122-28 (1975). For a discussion of situations in which state fair employment legislation
is important as a supplement to federal legislation, see Elson & Schanfield, Local Regula-
tion of Discriminatory Employment Practices, 56 YALE L.J. 431, 434 (1947).
16. In New York, the administrative agency is the State Division of Human Rights.
N.Y. EXEC. L. § 293 (McKinney 1972). See Comment, 34 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 127, 129
(1959), where it is noted that because enforcement depended upon either prosecution by
local officials or civil action by the individual claiming such discrimination, early state
and municipal attempts to eliminate unfair discrimination in areas including employment
proved ineffective. The administrative agency was thus established to avoid recourse to
the courts in all but the most extreme cases. See generally Carter, Practical Considera-
tions of Anti-Discrimination Legislation-Experience under the New York Law Against
Discrimination, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 40 (1954).
17. N.Y. EXEC. L. § 297(9) (McKinney 1975).
18. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. art. 78 (McKinney 1972).
19. N.Y. EXEC. L. §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972). See also N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11
(McKinney 1972): "No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected
to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person . . . firm, corporation, or
institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state."
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court for the first time in American Jewish Congress v. Carter.2 1
This is the only case dealing with foreign directed discrimination
which has, as yet, reached the appellate level; it typifies the
approach taken in subsequent cases. Carter was an Article 78
proceeding2' brought before the State Commission Against Dis-
crimination 2  [hereinafter referred to as SCAD]. Petitioner,
AJC, sought to vacate Commissioner Elmer A. Carter's dismissal,
for lack of probable cause, of charges of discriminatory hiring
practices by Aramco.
The practices complained of were both unlawful pre-
employment inquiries as to, religion made by Aramco in its New
York office for the purpose of ascertaining whether an applicant
was Jewish,23 and refusal to hire persons of Jewish ancestry for
positions in New York state, the United States, and foreign coun-
tries.24 Aramco maintained that the questions regarding religion
were proper because religion constituted a bona fide occupational
qualification for employment at its facilities in Saudi Arabia.
This argument was based upon the claim that Saudi Arabia
would not issue visas to persons of the Jewish faith or of Jewish
ancestry, and that any employment opportunity with Aramco
was contingent upon the ability to work in Saudi Arabia if the
need arose. In the administrative proceeding, Commissioner
Carter and a majority of SCAD saw merit in this argument and
20. 23 Misc. 2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959), modified, 10 App. Div. 2d 833,
199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1961).
21. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1972).
22. Now the State Division of Human Rights. See N.Y. EXEc. L. § 293 (McKinney
1972).
23. 23 Misc. 2d at 447, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 220-21. Such inquiries would be violative of
N.Y. EXEC. L. § 296(1)(d) (McKinney 1975), which reads in pertinent part:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(c) For any employer or employment agency to, print or circulate or cause
to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement or publication, or to
use any form of application for employment or to make any inquiry in connec-
tion with prospective employment, which expresses, directly or indirectly, any
limitation, specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color or na-
tional origin . . . unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.
24. Such a refusal would be violative of N.Y. EXEC. L. § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 1975),
which reads in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice (a) For an
employer . ..because of the age, race, creed, color, [or] national origin . ..of any
individual, to refuse to hire or employ. . . such individual. ... "
25. See Respondent-Appellants Memorandum [hereinafter cited as Carter Memo-
randum] at 36, American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
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ruled that, under the circumstances, religion was indeed a bona
fide qualification." Aramco's contention was not without sup-
port. In the Daytree proceedings held by SCAD in 1950,27 it had
ruled that the International Agency, an employee recruiter for
Aramco, would be
granted an exception to the general ruling that an individual
cannot be asked his or her religion and is permitted as a bona
fide occupational qualification to ask complainant his religion
since the information was a prerequisite toward receiving a visa
from the Arabian government in order for him to travel to Ara-
bia."'
With respect to Aramco, SCAD determined that it "was justified
in presenting to the complainant an Arabian form of application
for a visa containing questions as to the applicant's religion.""
Commissioner Carter, in the Daytree proceedings, expressed
his view that "the situation in Saudi Arabia is such that the
entrance of Jewish American citizens in that country at the pres-
ent time might result in international repercussions."3' In his
report to the Commission, SCAD Commissioner Robert E.
Thayer noted a telephone conversation he had with Mr. Fraser
Wilkins, Political Adviser for the Office of African and Near East
Affairs of the Department of State, in which Mr. Wilkins
stressed the importance of not having anything interfere with
the relations between the Arabian government and the Arabian
American Oil Company, explaining that this relationship was
the basis for the harmony between [our] governments and it
would be very serious indeed to our international interests if
anything was done to affect this relationship."
This view was reaffirmed in 1956 in an interview between the
then-Investigating Commissioner Carter and Mr. Lampton Berry
of the State Department, 32 and in 1957 by letters from the Assist-
ant Secretary of State to the Investigating Commissioner "to the
26. American Jewish Congress v. Arabian American Oil Co., Civil No. 4296-56 (1956).
27. See Daytree v. Int'l Placement Agency, Civil No. 2438-50 (1950), and Daytree v.
Arabian American Oil Co., Civil No. 2451-50 (1950), both discussed in Carter Memoran-
dum at 16.
28. Carter Memorandum at 17 (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 17-18.
32. Id. at 21.
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effect that the interest of the United States would be adversely
affected by a determination which would disturb the existing
relationship of Aramco with the Saudi Arabian government. 33
The Supreme Court of the State of New York, Special Term,
was unpersuaded by these arguments and ruled against Aramco.3 4
Citing a resolution of the United States Senate, 35 the court noted
that "the State Department has not sought to override the Senate
of the United States and Aramco cannot pretend that the State
Department has done so."" Similarly, the court refused to accept
Commissioner Carter's determinations regarding national secu-
rity because there had been no formal State Department declara-
tion to support his claims.37 The court noted that the AJC did not
question the authority of Saudi Arabia to decide that no Jews
should enter that country, but stated that Aramco could not sub-
ordinate the law of New York to the dictates of a foreign country
which violated New York's public policy. 8
The court took notice of the fact that of the 887 employees
on Aramco's New York payroll few, if any, were Jews, and stated
that even if such discrimination were due to the possibility that
every employee might be sent to Saudi Arabia, New York public
policy could not permit it.35 The concept of a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification was clarified by limiting permissible inquiry
into the religion of the applicant to situations in which a "failure
33. Id.
34. 23 Misc. 2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
35. S. Res. 323, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) provides:
Whereas it is a primary principle of our nation that there shall be no distinc-
tion among United States citizens based on their individual religious affiliations
and since any attempt by foreign nations to create such distinction among our
citizens in the granting of personal or commercial access or any other rights
otherwise available to United States citizens generally is inconsistent with our
principles; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that it regards any such distinc-
tions directed against United States citizens as incompatible with the relations
that should exist among friendly nations and that in all negotiations between
the United States and any foreign state every reasonable effort should be made
to maintain this principle.
36. 23 Misc. 2d at 449, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 451, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 224. For other cases holding that New York will not
subordinate its public policy to that of a foreign State, see Lederkremer v. Lederkremer,
173 Misc. 587, 18 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (refusal to allow a defense based on Polish
law in a proceeding to annul a marriage which took place in Poland); Johnson v. Briggs,
12 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Mun. Ct. of City of N.Y. 1939) (refusal to give local effect to confiscation
of property in Germany by German government).
39. 23 Misc. 2d at 449, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
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to permit such a qualification might interfere with the function-
ing of a religious organization."4 The determination of the Com-
missioner was annulled and the matter remitted to SCAD for
action "not inconsistent with this opinion."'4'
On appeal by Aramco, the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, modified the decision of Special Term and ordered remand
of the matter to SCAD for proceedings in accordance with the
Law Against Discrimination4 1 rather than with the conclusions
reached by Special Term:
We are of the opinion that probable cause exists for further
processing of this matter. The holding by the Commission to the
contrary was arbitrary and capricious. Until a final determina-
tion on the merits, in accordance with the statute, we may not
address ourselves, as did Special Term, to how the issue thereto
may be ultimately resolved.43
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Divi-
sion,44 directing the Investigating Commissioner to either "imme-
diately endeavor to eliminate the unlawful employment practice
complained. . . of. . . or refer the matter to the entire commis-
sion for a hearing."45 After efforts at conciliation failed, a public
hearing was held.46 The Commission determined that Aramco
had violated the law as charged and directed it to "cease and
desist" from refusing to hire Jews and from making pre-
employment inquiries concerning the religion of applicants.47
Aramco applied to the Supreme Court, New York County, for an
order annulling the Commission's order;48 the Commission moved
40. Id. at 448, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 221. This was the first time that a court so limited
the scope of the bona fide qualification. Prior to the Aramco decision, that requirement
had been interpreted by state human rights commissions, including that of New York, as
embracing "those attributes necessary for the proper performance of the work itself, al-
though they have excluded such grounds as possible employee friction, loss of customer
good will, or a traditional national or religious atmosphere in a business." Comment, 34
ST. JOHN'S L.R. 127, 129 (1959). See, e.g., Holland v. Edwards, 116 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 353, 122 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dep't 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 38,
119 N.E.2d 581, noted in 44 A.L.R.2d 1130 (1954).
41. 23 Misc. 2d at 452, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
42. Now the Human Rights Law, N.Y. ExEc. L. §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1975).
43. 10 App. Div. 2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1st Dep't 1960).
44. 9 N.Y.2d 223, 226, 173 N.E.2d 788, 789, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (1961).
45. Id.
46. 195 STATE Div. HUMAN RimHTS L. BULL. 8, 9 (1963).
47. Id. at 10.
48. Arabian American Oil Co. v. Fowler, Civil No. 17182-62 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
234 [Vol. 1I:2
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for an enforcement order,49 but prior to argument the matter was
terminated by a stipulation which provided:
in connection with applicants hired for work in Saudi Arabia
and with respect to applicants for employment who are required
during the course of their employment to travel to Saudi Arabia
or any other country, Aramco may advise such applicants that
their employment is contingent upon such applicants' ability to
obtain a visa from the Saudi Arabian government or from any
other country to which such applicants are required to travel
during the course of their employment. . . and [such] a clause
may be contained in employment applications for such employ-
ment .. provided, however, that Aramco shall make no in-
quiries into such applicants' race, creed, color, national origin
or ancestry in connection with the applicants' efforts to obtain
such visa, nor inform or advise the Saudi Arabian government
or any other government concerning such matters; and provided
further, however, that no such inquiries shall be made. . re-
lating to recruitment, interviewing, evaluation, or hiring of ap-
plicants."
Thus, the final outcome of the case did not appear to seri-
ously curtail the freedom of Aramco to discriminate because it
allowed Aramco to give notice that employment was contingent
upon ability to obtain a visa from Saudi Arabia. Since any of
Aramco's employees might be required to work in Saudi Arabia,
Jews as a class were automatically excluded and it could continue
to engage in discriminatory hiring practices even where purely
domestic employment was involved.
5 1
B. Limitations Upon State Actions
Sovereign Immunity
The traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits the
49. See N.Y. EXEC. L. § 298 (McKinney 1972).
50. 195 STATE Div. HUMAN RIGHTs L. BULL. 8, 10 (1963) (emphasis added).
51. In 1952, Aramco supplied the Commission with information as to its
domestic personnel who had work assignments in Saudi Arabia. This list indi-
cated that there were 887 employees on the New York payroll of Aramco. Of
these, 124 had permanently been transferred to Arabia, 210 had "in the past"
worked in Saudi Arabia . . . and 130 were "definitely scheduled for temporary
assignment or transfer" to Saudi Arabia. This amounted to a total of 464 em-
ployees. There still remained more than four hundred employees in Aramco's
New York office not in any of these categories.
Brief for Petitioner-Respondent at 54, American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 9 N.Y.2d 223,
173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
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courts of one sovereign from exercising jurisdiction over another
sovereign without the latter's consent.52 The increased entry of
governments into the realm of private commerce led to the devel-
opment of a more restrictive theory, whereby public acts (acta
jure imperii) would be accorded immunity from suit, while com-
mercial acts (acta jure gestionis) would not.53 In 1952, the United
States Department of State announced that it would adhere to
this restrictive theory in the Tate Letter. 4 But the larger underly-
ing object of the absolute doctrine, i.e., to "relieve the sovereign
of the burdens and indignities of civil litigation in a foreign
forum," 5 has been maintained.
The problem facing courts since the adoption of the restric-
tive theory is to differentiate between public and commercial
acts. The practice of the courts has been to defer to policy
pronouncements of the State Department which grant immun-
ity."6 When there is no such. advice from the State Department,
however, the court must independently determine whether the
52. See generally Note, Act of State - Sovereign Immunity, 13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 132
(1972). See also Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
53. See Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
54. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, United States Department of
State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
The restrictive doctrine received its earliest treatment in Bank of the United States v.
Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824). See also The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D.
Mass. 1941); United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.
1929); Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201
(2d Dep't 1940); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div.
189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1940). See generally Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The
Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REv. 608 (1954).
55. Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim - The Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 377, 415 (1974).
56. The role of the State Department in suggesting the grant of sovereign immunity
began with Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). The Peruvian government, as owner of a
merchant ship which had failed to deliver cargo, was granted a request for immunity by
the State Department. Reversing the district court, which had rejected the immunity plea
on the ground that Peru had waived immunity by taking preliminary steps in the litiga-
tion, the Court held that the suggestion of the State Department was conclusive.
Under this formulation, of course, the question of how the State Department
had reached its determination did not come up. The court would not review a
decision of the political arm of the government on a question considered to be
political, but the lower court was commanded to comply with that decision,
regardless of the character of the claim, any evidence of waiver of immunity, or
other points that might be raised by the plaintiff.
Lowenfeld, supra note 55, at 383. See also First Nat'l City Bank v. China, 348 U.S. 356,
360-61 (1955); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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foreign sovereign is entitled to immunity "in conformity to the
principles accepted by the department of the government charged
with the conduct of our foreign relations. ' 57 The Second Circuit
has stated that in the absence of a suggestion it will deny a claim
of sovereign immunity for all but five categories comprising those
"strictly political or public acts about which sovereigns have tra-
ditionally been quite sensitive.""
Defendant Aramco alluded to the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity in its argument, and claimed that enforcement of New
York's public policy would embarrass the State Department in
the Near East. The court dismissed this argument without explic-
itly analyzing the doctrine. Even if Saudi Arabia itself had been
directly responsible for hiring, rather than a separate (albeit
closely related) corporation,59 it is doubtful that the doctrine
would have been applied to deprive the court of jurisdiction. As-
suming arguendo that Saudi Arabia acted pursuant to its visa
57. In Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), a case involving a vessel owned by the
Mexican government but operated by a private firm,. the State Department declined to
grant an opinion as to whether or not immunity should be granted. The Court examined
its prerogatives when there is no suggestion:
In the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the political
branch of the government, the courts may decide for themselves whether all the
requisites of immunity exist ....
[I]t is a guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise
or surrender its jurisdiction in such cases, that the courts should not so act as
to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs.
324 U.S. at 34. The Court then decided that it should not grant immunity:
We can only conclude that it is the national policy not to extend the im-
munity in the manner now suggested, and that it is the duty of the courts, in a
matter so intimately associated with our foreign policy and which may pro-
foundly affect it, not to enlarge an immunity to an extent which the government
. . . has not seen fit to recognize.
324 U.S. at 38. Compare Ocean Transport Co. v. Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.
La. 1967) (although the State Department's finding that the transaction involved was a
private, rather than public, act was not necessarily binding, it was highly persuasive and
to be given great weight) with Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 382
(D.D.C. 1974) (a court "should show the same deference to a Department of State recom-
mendation, regardless of whether it suggests or declines to suggest immunity") and Aero-
trade Inc. v. Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (silence of State Department
necessitated decision by court on issue of immunity, which it granted).
58. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 360 (1964). The five categories are: "(1) internal administrative acts, such
as expulsion of an alien, (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization, (3) acts concerning
the armed forces, (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity, (5) public loans."
59. Saudi Arabia will obtain complete control of Aramco. Wall Street Journal, Mar.
4, 1976, at 14, col. 1. Even under these altered circumstances, the restrictive doctrine of
sovereign immunity would not be applied to the commercial activities of Saudi Arabia.
BROOKLYN J. INTL L.
policy and thus performed a public function, it is more likely that
a court would find that through Aramco it acted in a commercial
posture. Without a specific directive from the State Department,
such acts should clearly fall within the category of acta jure
gestionis.
Act of State
The Special Term opinion in the Aramco litigation briefly
noted that the "petitioner does not question the authority of
Saudi Arabia to decide that no Jews shall enter that country."0
The act of state doctrine is related to sovereign immunity in that
both are grounded in considerations of comity,"' but act of state
concerns justiciability rather than jurisdiction. By precluding
United States courts "from inquiring into the validity of acts
committed by a foreign state within its own territory,""z the doc-
trine insures that the judiciary does not infringe upon the author-
ity of the executive over foreign relations:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 3
The act of state doctrine is largely one of judicial restraint. 4 It
60. 23 Misc. 2d at 451, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
61. Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of
Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 476-77 (1963).
62. Note, First Amendment - Act of State - Federal Foreign Affairs Power, 16 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 456, 466 (1975).
63. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The doctrine was subsequently
reaffirmed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In that case the
Court held that pursuant to the act of state doctrine, the Cuban government's retention
of proceeds from the sale of expropriated sugar could not be overturned by the foreign
owners. In a case now pending before the Supreme Court reargument was specifically
requested with regard to the holding in Sabbatino. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc.,
345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nom, 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert,
granted, 416 U.S. 981, reargued, 44 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1976).
64. The . . . doctrine is compelled by neither international law nor by the
Constitution but has "constitutional underpinnings" in that it attempts to pre-
serve the proper relationships among the branches of government in a system
of separation of powers. By declining to pass on the validity of acts of a foreign
sovereign, a court is expressing its view that such an inquiry, if made at all, is
[Vol. II:2
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operates as a conflict of laws principle, and represents an excep-
tion to the general rule that a court of the United States will not
decline to decide cases when jurisdictional requirements are
met."5 It is this doctrine which the court in Carter implicitly relied
upon in refusing to pass judgment on Saudi Arabia's internal
policies. The situation was perceived as one more appropriate for
the sphere of diplomacy and negotiation.66
The doctrine has been relied upon most often in the context
of a foreign government's expropriation of property owned by
United States citizens within its own borders. 7 It was implicitly
applied in South African Airways v. New York State Division of
Human Rights"5 to support a ruling that the Division was without
jurisdiction to hear a complaint against the petitioner airline. 9
South African Airways was charged with systematically
discriminating against United States citizens on the basis of race,
pursuant to South Africa's visa restrictions. The issue of sover-
eign immunity was raised in the context of the absence of the
Consulate of South Africa. The court considered the Consulate a
necessary party to any proceeding since it was that office which
issued visas,70 although it concluded that "[t]he granting or de-
nying of visas is not within the power of the petitioner, but rather
a matter for decision by nations and their designated representa-
more properly the function of the political branches of government and that a
judicial pronouncement on the topic might hinder the pursuit of foreign policy
goals by the other branches. The doctrine also rests on a policy in favor of
respecting a foreign government's right to rule within its own territory.
Note, supra note 62, at 466 (citations omitted).
65. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763
(1972).
66. Cf. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvart Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The silence of the State Department cannot be interpreted
as consent to a court's non-application of the doctrine; such consent must be affirmatively
granted.
67. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
68. 64 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
69. Contra, Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 1971 Survey of N.Y. Law, 23 SYm. L. REv. 435,
461-62 (1972). Professor Herzog considers that sovereign immunity was the basis for the
decision, and that as such the case was correctly decided. This analysis is questionable,
since the airline was a separate entity from the Republic of South Africa. See Henkin,
The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 825
(1964).
70. But see Note, supra note 52, at 133-34 n.12, where it is argued that while the
Republic of South Africa was not designated as a necessary party pursuant to section 292
of the Executive Law, such a designation "would not, ipso facto, prevent a hearing on this
complaint."
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tives, in the fullest exercise of their sovereignty." 7' The decision
appears to confuse the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act
of state, invoking sovereign immunity while employing reasoning
more applicable to an act of state." Had the act of state doctrine
been properly applied, the court would have concluded that the
complaint concerned the activity of the airline, and that the visa
activity of the South African government was collateral.7 3
The court held that any action by the Division "would inter-
fere . . . with the foreign policy of the United States, [because
it] has seen fit to permit petitioner to operate in and out of the
United States. . . .Foreign policy is a Federal concern, not ame-
nable to State action." 4 Carter was distinguished because
[t]he actions of the oil company were in question, not those of
a foreign sovereign. However abhorrent the discriminatory poli-
cies of the Republic of South Africa and its consulate in New
York, no administrative or judicial remedy is here available
against them. No facts are alleged showing that petitioner is
engaged in implementing such policies."
The distinction between the two cases is not clear. It would seem
more consistent that Aramco and South African Airways, both
commercial entities violating New York public policy within New
York's territorial jurisdiction, should be amenable to suit regard-
less of the degree of control exercised by a foreign sovereign.7"
Furthermore, in denying the New York Division of Human Rights
jurisdiction to conduct hearings without first ascertaining the
position of the State Department or the President, the court acted
prematurely and without justification.77 If there were no basis for
the application of act of state or sovereign immunity, then the
71. 64 Misc. 2d at 710, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
72. See Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1876), for a similar blurring of
these two doctrines. This opinion did, however, antedate Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250 (1897).
73. See Note, 13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 132 (1972).
74. 64 Misc. 2d at 710-11, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
75. Id. at 712, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
76. Relevant considerations are that:
certain impingements on foreign affairs are excluded because national uniform-
ity is required; infringements are barred if they discriminate against or unduly
burden foreign relations; the Courts will balance the State's interest in a regula-
tion against the impact on American foreign relations.
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 241 (1972) (emphasis added). See Note,
supra note 62, at 471, for a discussion of these competing interests.
77. See Note, supra note 52, at 150.
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state could properly exercise jurisdiction pursuant to its police
power. 8
The self-imposed limitations of a state court to adjudicate
foreign acts of discrimination affecting state citizens were further
enunciated in New York Times Co. v. City of New York, Commis-
sion on Human Rights."5 The Times petitioned for review of the
Commission's order " enjoining it from printing advertisements
for employment in the Republic of South Africa. Although the
question of South Africa's discriminatory policies affecting
United States citizens was not directly at issue,8' the court in-
voked the act of state doctrine, 2 citing South African Airways v.
N. Y. State Division of Human Rights,3 Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino,84 and French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.5 The
court stated:
By its determination, the Commission, in effect was questioning
the employment methods and practices of a foreign government.
* . . Economic sanction should be adopted, whenever necessary,
on a Federal level and not by a local anti-discrimination agency
78. See Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DuKE L.J. 248, 297 (1965).
79. 79 Misc. 2d 1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1974), noted in Comment, 15 VA.
J. INT'L L. 473 (1975), and Note, note 62 supra.
80. 79 Misc. 2d at 1047, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 322; see N.Y. CITY AD. CODE §§ B1-1-12.0
(1971), which codifies the function and powers of the Commission.
81. The precise issue was whether the New York Times had aided and abetted the
discriminatory practices of South Africa by printing advertisements which, without overt
language, discriminated indirectly because the positions were located in South Africa and
could thus be read as automatically excluding blacks from eligibility. See Note, supra note
52, at 136-37, where the question of indirect discrimination in advertising is discussed in
the context of South Africa's advertising campaign to encourage United States tourism
in South Africa. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court ruling on the basis that
the New York Times was not discriminating in its advertising. New York Times Co. v.
City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 49 App. Div. 2d 851, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1st
Dep't 1975).
82. The vivid description given by the complainant's witnesses at the hearing
concerning the discriminatory manner of distributing recreational, sanitary and
other facilities in South Africa, only emphasized the interest of the Commission
in the governmental functions and practices of a foreign country.
79 Misc. 2d at 1050, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 325-26.
83. 67 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651. The court misconstrued the fact pattern in
this case, stating that it involved advertisements for employment with South African
Airways which were not available on a non-discriminatory basis.
84. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
85. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968). In this case, the New York
Court of Appeals declined to examine Cuban currency laws which effectively confiscated
property belonging to United States citizens. See generally Note, Sabbatino Comes Full
Circle: A Reconsideration in Light of Recent Decisions, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 260
(1971).
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which at best can only become involved in international prob-
lems far removed from the scope of its limited jurisdiction."
The application of the act of state doctrine in New York Times
v. City of New York, Commission on Human Rights, while not
improper in light of its history and purpose, puts it to a novel use.
The court unnecessarily attenuates the scope of the doctrine
when it is actually superfluous to the holding. 7
In interpreting the doctrine in this fashion, the court makes
it evident that certain acts and policies of foreign nations will, as
a matter of practical necessity, be considered beyond the control
of local administrative agencies and state judiciaries. State courts
must defer to the executive branch of the federal government,
which is more competent to deal with matters involving foreign
relations, even when presented with an unequivocal violation of
state public policy within the borders of the state. Such unfortu-
nate judicial restraint results from a number of factors: the
dearth of judicial precedent, the questions unanswered by the
Supreme Court with regard to the breadth of the application of
Sabbatino,8 and the absence of effective legislative guidelines. 9
It is submitted that legislation specifically directed at acts
of discrimination done pursuant to a foreign sovereign's domestic
policy should be adopted in order to allow adequate remedies in
86. 79 Misc. 2d at 1050, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 325-26.
87. The court held that the Times had not violated any antidiscrimination statute
because no reference to race or color was made directly or indirectly. 79 Misc. 2d at 1052,
362 N.Y.S.2d at 327, afl'd, 49 App. Div. 2d 851, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1st Dep't 1975). See
Comment, supra note 79, at 480, where it is considered an unwarranted application of the
doctrine to extend it beyond the expropriation of foreign property within the border of a
sovereign state.
88. The Court stated that:
we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government ... in
the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law.
376 U.S. at 429. Some of these questions may, however, be answered in the near future.
See note 63 supra.
89. The Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970), prohibits courts
from applying the act of state doctrine without permission from the executive. The
Amendment has generally been ignored. In First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), six Justices concurred in rejecting the view that the courts must
follow such an executive order to rule on the merits, without deciding independently
whether the act of state doctrine should apply. The Hickenlooper Amendment was not
mentioned in the majority opinion, and only discussed in a footnote of the dissenting
opinion, 406 U.S. at 780 n.5, in which Justice Brennan stated that he agreed with the
Court that the Hickenlooper Amendment was inapplicable.
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state administrative agencies and courts." The New York state
legislature has not yet addressed itself specifically to an Aramco
or South African Airways situation. An aggrieved party who
wishes to litigate this type of employment discrimination in a
New York state court would have to rely upon the general lan-
guage of the Human Rights Law.9' However, an amendment to
the Human Rights Law making unlawful any boycott or refusal
to deal because of "race, creed, color, national origin, or sex" and
providing sanctions and penalties for noncompliance, was signed
into law on August 6, 1975, and became effective on January 1,
1976.92 New York is the only state to have enacted such legisla-
90. Granting such power to the states would avoid decisions such as New York Times
Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79 Misc. 2d 1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321
(1970), where the court determined that the Commission, in enjoining advertising, was
effectively levelling an economic sanction against the Republic of South Africa.
Such a reallocation of powers would not represent an infringement upon protected
constitutional rights, because "both the law and theory of government of the United
States prohibits the Executive from exercising the foreign affairs power under a treaty or
agreement if its exercise violates the constitutional rights of American citizens." Note,
supra note 52, at 150.
91. N.Y. ExEc. L. § 296(1)(a), (d) (McKinney 1972).
92. N.Y. ExEc. L. §§ 296(13), 298-a (McKinney Supp. 1975). § 296(13) provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice (i) for any person to discriminate
against, boycott, or blacklist, or to refuse to buy from, sell to or trade with, any
person, because of the race, creed, color, national origin or sex of such person,
or of such person's partners, members, stockholders, directors, officers, manag-
ers, superintendants, agents, employees, business associates, suppliers, or cus-
tomers, or (ii) for any person willfully to do any act or refrain from doing any
act which enables any such person to take such action. This subdivision shall
not apply to:
(a) Boycotts connected with labor disputes; or
(b) Boycotts to protest unlawful discriminatory practices.
§ 298-a provides in pertinent part:
Application of article to certain acts committed outside the state of New York.
1. The provisions of this article shall apply as hereinafter provided to an
act committed outside this state against a resident of this state or against a
corporation organized under the laws of this state or authorized to do business
in this state, if such act would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice if
committed within this state.
2. If a resident person or domestic corporation violates any provision of
this article by virtue of the provisions of this section, this article shall apply to
such person or corporation in the same manner and to the same extent as such
provisions would have applied had such act been committed within this state
except that the penal provisions of such article shall not be applicable.
3. If a non-resident person or foreign corporation violates any provision of
this article by virtue of the provisions of this section, such person or corporation
shall be prohibited from transacting any business within this state . . . . A
person or corporation who or which transacts business in this state in violation
of any such order is guilty of a class A misdemeanor . . ..
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tion, as it appears to be the only state to have been concerned
with this issue to date.93 There is in existence at this time federal
legislation directed to the issue of boycotts,94 although, as dis-
cussed below,95 it is questionable whether its wording is strong
enough to result in meaningful enforcement.
Federal Supremacy
Constraints upon state action are imposed by the federal
system itself. Although the various state human rights laws are
protected by the tenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,9" the supremacy clause97 and the treaty clause9" dictate that
foreign policy is exclusively within the domain of the federal gov-
ernment.99 In United States v. Belmont,' the Supreme Court
held that state policy must yield when it adversely affects
international relations:
Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but
is vested exclusively in the national government ....
Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be
exercised without regard to state law or policies. 10
Similarly, in United States v. Pink,0 2 the Court stated:
If state laws and policies did not yield before the exercise of
external powers of the United States, then our foreign policy
might be thwarted . . . The nation as a whole would be held
to answer if a State created difficulty with a foreign power.0 3
93. For a discussion of fair employment statutes, both state and federal, see Annot.,
44 A.L.R.2d 1138 (Supp. 1975).
94. Export Regulation Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
95. See text accompanying notes 114-121 infra.
96. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONsT. amend. X. See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Cooney v. Katzer,
41 Misc. 2d 236, 245 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963); American Jewish Congress v. Carter,
23 Misc. 2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
97. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have the Power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations. .. "
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2: "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties ... "
99. See HENKIN, supra note 76, at 242.
100. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
101. Id. at 330-31.
102. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
103. Id. at 232.
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In Pink, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion relied upon
Russian Republic v. Cibrario,0 4 in which the New York Court of
Appeals denied Russia access to New York state courts in order
not to "thwart the policy which the United States had
adopted."'' 15
More recently, in Zschernig v. Miller,' the Court held that
states cannot question the political and social ideology of foreign
sovereigns; anything more than a routine reading of foreign laws
constitutes an improper intrusion into the field of foreign af-
fairs.' "' Without further guidance, the scope of this permissible
routine reading is difficult to determine. 8 When dealing with
transnational situations, the capacity of states to pursue their
own policy goals is limited.0 9 The Court did not address itself to
the question of whether a state's public policy, even if in complete
harmony with the United States Constitution (and judicial inter-
pretation of federal civil rights legislation), would nevertheless be
struck down as intruding upon exclusively federal territory ° be-
cause a collateral question of foreign affairs was involved. These
issues aside, Zschernig continues the pattern of restriction on
state action vis-&-vis foreign policy begun by Belmont and Pink.
II. REMEDIES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
As a result of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,111
104. 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
105. Id. at 263, 139 N.E. at 262. This case was decided prior to the United States
recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
106. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Zschernig declared unconstitutional as applied an Oregon
statute which prohibited a non-resident alien from inheriting local property unless citizens
of Oregon enjoyed a reciprocal right in the alien's country.
107. See generally Comment, note 79 supra.
108. See HENKIN, supra note 76, at 239. For a list of decisions after Zschernig in which
states construed their alien inheritance statutes as constitutional, see Comment, supra
note 79, at 477 n.26.
109. Id. at 477. Professor Henkin comments that:
It may be, then, that Zschernig v. Miller excludes only state actions that reflect
a state policy critical of foreign governments and involve "sitting in judgment"
on them. Even if so limited, the new doctrine might cast doubts on the right of
the States to continue to invoke their own "public policy" in transnational
situations.
HENKIN, supra note 76, at 240-41 (citations omitted).
110. See HENKIN, supra note 76, at 243. See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . ..
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an individual refused employment because of religious practices
or ancestry may bring an action in federal court. To date, the Act
has not been litigated on these grounds. In 1975, however, the
ADL filed charges with the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission accusing Aramco and three other United States cor-
porations of discriminatory practices in violation of the
aforementioned Act."2 The charge before the Commission is a
prerequisite for suit in federal district court, as permission of the
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission is required before
such a suit may be instituted. '3
The problem of preventing the acquiescence of United States
businesses to the pressure created by foreign blacklists received
congressional attention in section 2402 of the Export Regulation
Act.'" The Act contains a statement of policy"' ' which the Presi-
dent is granted extensive power to effectuate."' As the Act reads
now, however, it is rather vague and difficult to enforce.
The mechanics of enforcement depend upon the reports of
those domestic corporations receiving requests to sign agreements
from foreign entities,"'7 and aggressive enforcement by the Secre-
tary of Commerce is essential." 8 If the conduct of former Secre-
(b) (2) It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employment agency
to fail or refuse to refer for employment . . . any individual on the basis of his
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
112. .N.Y. Times, June 11, 1975, at 10, col. 5.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. IV, 1974).
114. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
115. 50 U.S.C. § 2402(5) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
It is the policy of the United States (A) to oppose restrictive trade practices or
boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries
friendly to the United States, (B) to encourage and request domestic concerns
engaged in the export of articles, materials, supplies, or information, to refuse
to take any action, including the furnishing of information or the signing of
agreements, which has the effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade
practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any foreign country against another
country friendly to the United States, and (C) to foster international coopera-
tion and the development of international rules and institutions to assure rea-
sonable access to world supplies.
116. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
To effectuate the policies set forth in . . . this Act . . . the President may
prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States, its territories and
possessions, of any articles, materials, or supplies, including technical or any
other information . . . [A]Ill domestic concerns receiving requests for the fur-
nishing of information or the signing of agreements as specified in . . . [50
U.S.C. § 2402(5)] must report this fact to the Secretary of Commerce for such
action as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of that section.
117. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
118. 50 U.S.C. § 2403 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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tary of Commerce Morton, who refused to disclose to the House
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations the names of
those companies contacted by the Arabs with regard to boycot-
ting Israeli trade,"' is indicative of the position of the executive
branch with regard to this policy, it is questionable whether the
Act will have any power whatsoever."' To strengthen the Act, an
amendment was proposed in the House of Representatives which
would expressly prohibit the support of restrictive trade practices
or boycotts imposed by a foreign country.12' Such an amendment
would unfortunately not vitiate lack of cooperation by the execu-
tive branch.
Additionally, H.R. 5246 of 1975, 1 a bill to amend the Federal
Criminal Code, 123 was introduced in the House of Representatives
on March 20,1975, and referred to the House Judiciary Commit-
tee. This bill expressly addresses itself to economic coercion de-
signed to effectuate discrimination and the failure or refusal to
employ target groups as a result of such coercion. It establishes
penalties for violation of its provisions, and grants a remedy to
119. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1975, at 4, col. 4.
120. On September 22, 1975, the American Jewish Congress filed suit against the
Secretary of Commerce in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
American Jewish Congress v. Richardson, Civil No. 75-1541 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 22, 1975),
to compel him to make public the names of those companies. The suit, brought under the
Freedom of Information Act, sought "an injunction to bar Commerce Department officials
from withholding their files on United States firms that were asked to comply." N.Y.
Times, Sept. 23, 1975, at 4, col. 4.
121. H.R. 4967, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975):
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
That section 4(b)(1) [50 U.S.C. 2403(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974)] of the Export
Administration Act of 1969 is amended by adding at the end thereof a new
sentence as follows: Such rules and regulations shall prohibit, in furtherance of
the policy set forth in section 3(5)(A) and (B) [50 U.S.C. 2402(5) (Supp. IV,
1974)] of any actions, including the furnishing of information or the signing of
agreements, by domestic concerns engaged in the export of articles, materials,
or supplies, including technical data, from the United States which have the
effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade practices or boycotts fos-
tered or imposed by any foreign country against another country friendly to the
United States: Provided, That nothing contained in this sentence shall be con-
strued to authorize the imposition of any sanction against any business concern
in a country friendly to the United States which is engaged in the export of
articles, materials or supplies, including technical data, to the United States
and to any foreign country fostering or imposing such restrictive trade practices
or boycotts: Provided further, That this paragraph shall not apply to any action
authorized by an international organization in which the United States con-
curred.
122. H.R. 5246, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
123. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-45 (1970).
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an aggrieved party.'24 Although this bill, if enacted, would un-
doubtedly constitute the most comprehensive remedial and pre-
ventative legislation in this area, it is questionable whether even
such legislation would have an appreciable effect on employment
practices of United States corporations doing business in foreign
countries. Despite the apparent attempt of this bill to enable
courts to avoid applying the act of state doctrine, the fact remains
that no legislation of the United States can affect a foreign sover-
eign's power to issue visas or exclude any person on whatever
grounds it wishes.
I1. CONCLUSION
The commitment of state legislatures and Congress to civil
rights has been demonstrated by the enactment of state human
rights laws and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The effectiveness of
this legislation, however, depends upon its enforcement by the
courts, and this is particularly true in the context of discrimina-
124. The text of H.R. 5246 reads in pertinent part:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
That title 18 of the United States Code is amended by inserting immedi-
ately after section 245 the following new section:
' § 246. Economic coercion based on religion, race, national origin, sex,
or certain other factors
'(a) It shall be unlawful for any business enterprise or person acting on
behalf of or in the interest of a business enterprise to coerce by economic
means, or to attempt to coerce by economic means, another person, where
an object of such coercion is to cause such other person to fail to do
business with, to fail to employ, to subject to economic loss or injury, or
otherwise to discriminate against, any United States person, or any for-
eign person with respect to its activities in the United States, by reason
of -
'(1) the religion, race, national origin, or sex of such United
States or foreign person, or of any officer, director, employee, or
creditor of, or any owner of any interest in, such United States or
foreign person; or
'(2) direct or indirect support for any foreign government, or
dealing with or in, any foreign country by such United States or
foreign person, or by any officer, director, employee, or creditor of,
or any owner of any interest in, such United States or foreign
person, when such support or dealing is not in violation of the laws
of the United States.
'(e) The Attorney General may institute an action in rem or in per-
sonam, on behalf of the United States, in an appropriate United States
district court, to collect a civil penalty against any person who violates
subsection (a).
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tory practices which are the result of foreign influence. The recent
decisions of New York state courts do not give cause for opti-
mism: a South African corporation has been permitted to deny
the use of its facilities to black citizens of the United States' 5 and
a United States corporation has been permitted to deny employ-
ment to Jewish citizens of the United States solely upon the basis
of an assertion that corporate employees might be required to
work in Saudi Arabia.' 6 Without question, the discriminatory
policies of foreign nations, particularly the blacklisting by Arab
countries, have resulted in the violation of the constitutional
rights of United States citizens.
The passage of new federal legislation specifically aimed at
economic coercion by foreign nations is crucial because it would
provide direction and guarantee uniformity not attainable by
individual state legislation.' It is submitted that the courts must
play an active role in enforcing such laws. The consequence of
unimpeded discriminatory practices will be the erosion of United
States constitutional safeguards. The need for such protection is
manifest; discrimination must not be permitted in the name of
business expedience.
Charles M. Sporn
125. South African Airways v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 64 Misc. 2d 707,
315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
126. American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
127. The need for federal legislation is underscored by the fact that since January 1,
1976 (the date upon which the anti-blacklist provisions of the Human Rights Law took
effect), a substantial amount of shipping has been diverted to ports located in states other
than New York. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1976, at 1, col. 7. See note 92 supra.
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